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Introduction
There are decades where nothing happens and then there are weeks where decades 
happen, Lenin is supposed to have said. Maybe not in a week, but certainly in a cou-
ple of them, our global economy and trade politics changed significantly. Between 
June and October 2016, Brexit happened, Donald Trump became elected as Presi-
dent of the United States (USA), a trade agreement between the European Union 
(EU) and Canada was almost scuppered and another transatlantic trade agreement 
between the EU and the US was effectively derailed.
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Although not really the first time free trade became contested—the alter-globali-
sation movement caught attention in the late 1990s with successful protests against 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and against the launch of a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) negotiating round in Seattle—the breadth and intensity of pub-
lic debate of recent years is unprecedented. In the USA, trade was one of the most 
prominent themes during the 2016 Presidential election campaign. Not only Trump 
but also the major candidates in the Democratic Party (Hillary Clinton and, espe-
cially, Bernie Sanders) felt the need to distance themselves from one of President 
Obama’s chief foreign policy achievements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
a trade agreement between the USA and eleven other countries around the Pacific 
Rim. Although the decisive explanation for Trump’s victory is still debated, con-
vincing a couple of thousand blue collar workers in a number of Rust Belt states 
that had previously voted for Obama has been a key factor. His anti-trade rhetoric 
played a significant role in that. In Europe, tens of thousands of people participated 
in rallies protesting against the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the USA. More than three million EU citi-
zens signed a petition to ask for the termination of these negotiations. In the slip-
stream of the TTIP protests, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, or 
CETA, between the EU and Canada came under fire and was almost defeated when 
the Belgian region of Wallonia refused to allow the Federal Government to sign the 
agreement. Also the historical decision of the United Kingdom (UK) in a referen-
dum to leave the EU is linked to trade. As with Trump, the high majorities that voted 
for Brexit in the referendum in former industrial heartlands in the West Midlands is 
partly explained as revenge by the ‘losers of globalisation’. After the referendum, 
establishing a new trade relationship with the EU, but also with the rest of the world, 
is the major challenge for the UK government.
Trade policy has become politicised. It has been dragged out of technocratic cir-
cles where only a handful of specialists mastered the discourse and details. Has the 
academic literature on trade policy foreseen and/or responded to this change? For 
long, mainstream analyses have treated trade policy as a technocratic policy domain 
without problematising this state of affairs. Trade policy was conceived to be about 
pursuing an optimal outcome (of liberalisation), which was obstructed by protection-
ist interest groups. Economists explained how comparative advantage makes free 
trade desirable while political scientists analysed how reciprocal trade liberalisation 
could help office-seeking politicians to overcome domestic protectionist opposition 
to this optimal outcome of free trade. There was hence little real ‘politics’, in the 
sense of attention for competing worldviews, ideas and objectives or power imbal-
ances, involved in the study of trade policy. Has this changed after the politicisation 
of trade policy?
Three recently published books on trade policy allow us to answer this question. 
Each book is written by seasoned observers of trade politics. Dani Rodrik, author of 
Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane Economy, is an economist who is currently 
Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard. He has been publishing on 
trade policy for over 30 years. Sieglinde Gstöhl and Dirk De Bièvre, authors of The 
Trade Policy of the European Union, are professors in political science at the Col-
lege of Europe and the University of Antwerp, respectively, and have been writing 
Understanding EU trade politics after TTIP, Trump and Brexit 
on trade politics for more than 15 years. Alasdair Young, author of The New Politics 
of Trade: Lessons from TTIP, is Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. 
Also his publications on trade go back to the early 2000s.
Each of the three books belongs to a different format and has its own objectives 
and merits. Straight Talk on Trade is a collection of essays directed to the wider pub-
lic explaining why most trade policy observers and decision-makers failed to antici-
pate the recent contestation of the policy domain and the consequences of that. The 
Trade Policy of the European Union is a textbook offering a comprehensive intro-
duction to (the study of) EU trade policy. The New Politics of Trade, finally, is a 
short research monograph in which the author applies his insights on trade politics 
to one of the controversies mentioned above, the TTIP negotiations. I will review 
each book in turn, then discuss how they collectively advance our knowledge and 
end with pointing at some research avenues they open. I start with discussing Dani 
Rodrik’s book. It can be seen as an academic’s way of saying ‘I told you so!’ to the 
rest of the world. Although especially addressing his fellow economists, the argu-
ments about the need to change our thinking about trade policy are also very per-
tinent for political economists with a political science background. Then I review 
Gstöhl and De Bièvre’s textbook, which offers a nice overview of the current politi-
cal science literature on EU trade policy. In that way, it helps us check to what extent 
this literature already responds to Rodrik’s criticisms on trade policy analyses. 
Finally, Young’s book is a specific quest to understand and explain the new politics 
of trade, with TTIP as the case study.
Straight talk on trade
Dani Rodrik’s book is a collection of accessible essays, which build on his exten-
sive oeuvre on globalisation, including research on trade policy, industrialisation, 
development and the use of economic models. Already two decades ago, he warned 
in Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Rodrik 1997) that globalisation cheerlead-
ers, including in the economics discipline, were neglecting the fact that more glo-
balisation is not always good, that there are always trade-offs involved, and that too 
much economic integration can lead to social disintegration. In 2011, he articulated 
this thesis even more forcefully in The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, 
States and Democracy Can’t Co-Exist (Rodrik 2011). Now, after Trump and Brexit, 
Rodrik is considered a visionary.
The book opens with the provocative question: ‘Are economists responsible for 
Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential election?’ (p. ix). Rodrik 
claims that ‘had economists gone public with the caveats, uncertainties, and scepti-
cism of the seminar room, they might have become better defenders of the world 
economy’ (p. xii). Instead, by singing the praise of globalisation, they lost credibility 
and left the field to populists like Trump to make a blunt attack on economic inte-
gration. The response Rodrik got from his colleagues when he warned against the 
costs of hyper-globalisation was that he was giving ammunition to the barbarians. In 
this way, the preface of the book lays out the core argument that is further developed 
in later chapters. The explanation for why economists unambiguously support trade 
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agreements can be found in their political economy models. Their positive explana-
tion and normative justification for trade agreements is that these allow governments 
to ‘tie their own hands’ in order to prevent that they or their successors would be 
captured by protectionist interest groups. This model has been developed after the 
Second World War with the Great Depression, exacerbated by protectionist beggar-
thy-neighbour policies, closely in mind. In this perspective, special interest groups 
of a protectionist nature are the barbarians. Free trade agreements should be whole-
heartedly supported as mechanisms to weaken them.
Rodrik problematises this assumption that is still influencing thinking on trade 
today. Trade liberalisation has already gone so far that the aggregate gains from new 
trade deals have become negligible, while distributive effects have increased. Hence, 
there are not that many gains left that barbarians can prevent us from reaping. More 
importantly, in the current globalised world, the strongest ‘special interest groups’ 
in trade are no longer domestic protectionist firms (who have been weakened as a 
consequence of past liberalisation) but multinational corporations, who will try to 
capture trade policy to advance their own self-interests. By overstating the benefits 
of globalisation and underplaying the costs, Rodrik argues, economists ‘effectively 
favour one set of self-interested parties—“barbarians”—over another’ (p. x).
The book not only contains chapters on trade, but also on issues such as develop-
ment, financial globalisation, the euro area and the economic discipline, which are 
less relevant for this review. The common theme throughout the book is that econo-
mists have failed to make a balanced contribution to public debate on this variety 
of topics. In one of the first chapters, Rodrik challenges another widely held belief 
in academia and politics: that the nation-state has become obsolete and that ‘global 
governance’ is both desirable and feasible. He argues that the nation-state is still the 
most important level at which societies are organised, and makes a normative case 
for this situation. As a market needs rules to function, the withering away of nation-
states would mean that uniform global rules would have to be adopted. This would 
be undesirable as local communities have different preferences and as it would pre-
clude experimentation with rules. Hence, the fundamental imbalance between the 
global nature of markets and the domestic nature of the rules that govern them, 
which is responsible for globalisation’s current ills, cannot be corrected through 
global governance, but only by restricting the reach of markets. This rejection of 
global governance as a viable solution for the problems caused by globalisation is a 
necessary argument for the book’s subsequent analyses and prescriptions.
In a number of chapters in the middle of the book, Rodrik gives his vision on 
what ‘good economics’ entails. The chapters provide a defence of the discipline 
but a rebuke to those who use it incorrectly. In a chapter on ‘Economists and their 
models’, which is based on another recent Rodrik book Economics Rules (2015), 
he criticises economists’ interventions in public trade (and other) debates based on 
economic models without mentioning the (often unrealistic) assumptions behind 
these models or the limits of what they can forecast. This leads him to advocate 
for more open disagreement between economists in recognition of the diversity of 
economic approaches. The ‘art’ of good economics, Rodrik argues, is to be able 
to choose between different economic models on the basis of which one is best 
suited for a particular set of conditions. He defends a vision of academics as ‘foxes’, 
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‘scholars who are able to navigate from one explanatory framework to another as 
circumstances require’ (p. 158), rather than ‘hedgehogs’, scholars who ‘believe’ in 
a single big idea. The author calls on economists to pay more attention to the role 
of ‘ideas’ besides interests to explain economic, social and political affairs. The 
‘rational choice political economy’ model, while providing an elegant explanation 
for many social phenomena, includes an often-unstated assumption that all actors 
are self-interested and, hence, politicians are always prone to be captured by spe-
cial interest groups. This cynical view on politics also leaves little room for improv-
ing matters. Rodrik calls for an introduction of ideas in political economy models 
that affect how actors define their preferences, constraints and policy choices. This 
would make economics more realistic, and able to change policy for the better, he 
argues. Political economy models that rely solely on ‘vested interest’ have a static 
bias: absent exogenous shocks such as revolutions or crises, changing policies is 
considered unlikely. But if economists allow for the role of ideas in politics, they can 
also conceive of their own role as ‘policy innovators’ in which they can successfully 
advocate change.
Based on his analysis of what is wrong in current academic thinking and poli-
cies on trade and related issues, in the final three chapters Rodrik looks for solu-
tions. He starts with explaining ‘What will not work’. The author dismisses the two 
mainstream responses to the current malaise of globalisation: compensating the los-
ers and global governance. The idea that the backlash against globalisation can be 
avoided through domestic compensation of the losers by the winners of liberalisa-
tion, neglects the fact that globalisation makes it more difficult to tax the winners. 
Current trade agreements strengthen multinational corporations even more, without 
much evidence that they promote societal welfare. Rodrik cites intellectual property 
rights, investor rights protection and regulatory cooperation as examples. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to also change the rules of globalisation. But global govern-
ance with homogeneous rules and policies is not the answer either, for reasons the 
author explained earlier.
Rodrik then proposes his solution through seven new rules for the global econ-
omy (p. 222 ff.): (1) ‘[m]arkets must be deeply embedded in systems of govern-
ance’; (2) ‘[d]emocratic governance and political communities are organised largely 
within nation-states, and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future’; (3) ‘[t]
here is no “one way” to prosperity’; (4) ‘countries have the right to protect their own 
regulations and institutions’; (5) ‘[c]ountries do not have the right to impose their 
institutions on others’; (6) ‘[t]he purpose of international economic arrangements 
must be to lay down the traffic rules for managing the interface among national 
institutions’; and (7) ‘[n]ondemocratic countries cannot count on the same rights 
and privileges in the international order as democracies’. Of these, the fourth, fifth 
and sixth principles are most important, and most controversial. As Rodrik speci-
fies, countries should be allowed to ‘raising barriers at the border if necessary, when 
trade demonstrably threatens domestic practices enjoying broad popular support’ (p. 
224). Global procedural rules should ensure that trade barriers are only erected if 
really necessary to protect widely held domestic preferences, and without impos-
ing preferences on other sovereign states. While differentiating measures that legit-
imately protect domestic preferences from those that simply protect unproductive 
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firms might be difficult (cfr. Trachtman 2013), Rodrik makes a case to allow coun-
tries to take measures to avoid that trade undercuts domestic social bargains, as this 
is necessary to maintain public support for an open trading system.
These new rules for the global economy allow for more policy space for national 
governments. Rodrik then puts forward ideas for how to use this space domestically 
for productivity-enhancing and socially inclusive policies. The final, short chapter is 
called ‘It’s the politics, stupid!’. Here, Rodrik reminds us that globalisation is not an 
unstoppable force of nature but has been made by politics and is malleable by politi-
cians. Only if mainstream politicians offer a vision of how to make globalisation 
more sustainable and fair will they take the wind out of the sails of extremists. ‘It’s 
the politics, stupid!’ is one of the key messages of Rodrik to his fellow economists. 
Dani Rodrik believes that economists can learn from their colleagues in political sci-
ence and sociology departments, and has himself been influenced by Karl Polanyi, 
John Ruggie and other constructivist social scientists. This multidisciplinary attitude 
makes his writings a refreshing read. It also means that his ideas about the need 
to rethink our understanding of trade politics are also directly relevant for politi-
cal economists with a background in political science. In sum, Rodrik explains the 
recent politicisation of trade policy as a welcome response of civil society to the 
uncritical attitude of the large majority of politicians and academics towards the cur-
rent free trade regime. He hopes that this will result in a re-embedding of the regime 
in domestic social policy choices.
The trade policy of the European Union
Gstöhl and De Bièvre rightly claim that their The Trade Policy of the European 
Union is ‘the first real political science textbook on European trade policy’ (p. xi).1 
It offers an excellent introduction by discussing in a ‘pluridisciplinary’ way the main 
legal, economic, political science and international relations insights to the policy 
domain. The authors state that their ambition is modest, by refraining from ‘the 
formulation of broad sweeping statements of what the EU should [or] is likely to 
[do] in the future’ (p. 8). Rather, it wants to explain how trade policy affects inter-
est groups that may or may not organise to influence these policies, how the EU’s 
institutional setup makes some outcomes more likely than others and how this is all 
affected by international developments. As the authors write themselves, the closest 
they come to making their own argument in the book is that EU trade policy is prone 
to continuity and conservatism because it is governed by supermajorities.
The book opens with explaining why its subject is important. It starts by suc-
cinctly clarifying to the reader why countries trade in the first place. Then it 
explicates why the EU member states decided already in the Treaty of Rome to 
transfer the competence for trade policy to the supranational level. This was a 
1 Alasdair Young and John Peterson’s Parochial Global Europe of (2014) also covers most of the issues 
pertaining to the policy domain, but rather holds the middle between a research monograph and a text-
book by offering a specific perspective (a ‘policy subsystem approach’) on the issue area.
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logical corollary of their decision to establish a customs union, the raison d’être 
of post-war European integration. A welcome side effect of the decision to supra-
nationalise trade policy was that it strengthened the member states’ position in 
the world trading system. Together with the USA, the EU is still the main trade 
power in the world. In a separate chapter, the book elaborates on the legal devel-
opment of the common commercial policy. It reviews the origins of the common 
commercial policy and how the competence has subsequently evolved through 
interpretations by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and several 
Treaty reforms. By discussing the consequences of the important Lisbon Treaty 
revisions to the common commercial policy and a recent CJEU opinion on the 
EU-Singapore trade agreement, readers are fully up-to-date with the legal state of 
affairs and its implications. In that way, this chapter also helps to understand why 
the wish of the UK to negotiate its own trade agreements implies that it has to 
leave the EU customs union, and the complications of this.
Subsequently, the authors introduce in detail EU trade policy’s key (official, 
business and societal) players, decision-making procedures and policy instru-
ments. They differentiate between different ‘types’ of EU trade policy: negotiat-
ing bilateral, regional or multilateral trade agreements, implementation of trade 
policy and applying unilateral trade policy measures. Very detailed descriptions 
of how decisions in these different trade policies are made, illustrated by acces-
sible flowcharts and interesting case studies, which make the book also interest-
ing for professionals working on EU trade policy. What may seem like technical 
details are invaluable to understanding and explaining EU trade policy. As the 
authors argue in the next chapter, different policy-making settings enable or con-
strain policy choices to different extents.
In the chapter on political economy perspectives on EU trade policy, Gstöhl 
and De Bièvre differentiate theories based on the level of analysis they focus 
on: the international system, society and the state. While theories belonging to 
the first category explain EU trade policy as responses to challenges and oppor-
tunities offered by the international structure, the second explains it as a func-
tion of conflict between domestic organised societal interest groups, while the 
latter conceives of policy-makers as largely insulated from interest groups and 
with some freedom to act within the international structure. The ‘principle-agent’ 
and ‘two-level game’ approaches are discussed as perspectives that integrate 
these levels of analysis in a dynamic, complex manner. These help explain the 
apparent contradiction that the European Commission gains bargaining power by 
being constrained by high voting thresholds in the Council, but more so when it 
holds defensive than offensive interests (hence the EU’s ‘conservatism bias’). The 
authors demonstrate the usefulness of these accounts by applying them to the EU-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement. The theories discussed are mostly rational-
choice institutionalist in nature. Interests, given by one’s economic position, are 
supposed to inform actors’ preferences and the extent to which actors are able to 
defend their preferences largely depends on the structure of institutions. Ideas and 
constructivist approaches to EU trade policy are briefly mentioned in the con-
text of those accounts that hold that decision-makers can have autonomous trade 
policy preferences, and might be able to pursue them.
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The next chapter focuses on the EU in the World Trade Organization. Besides 
offering a crash-course into the WTO, it explains how the EU’s role in the organisa-
tion gradually increased over the decades, from a defensive player in the first Round 
towards a co-shaper in the late 1980s and eventually the leader around the turn of 
the millennium. The latest ‘Doha Development Round’ that was mainly advocated 
by the EU is discussed in detail, including positions taken by the EU and the reasons 
for its eventual failure. The authors also explain how the EU operates in the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the WTO, since the failure of the Doha Round the most 
important function of the organisation.
The book does not contain separate chapters on bilateral and unilateral EU trade 
policies but instead discusses these levels in the context of chapters on trade and 
development and on challenges for EU trade policy, which is a choice that works 
well. Development has always been one of the main objectives that the EU has 
pursued in the policy domain, mostly through the bilateral and unilateral channels. 
The authors start by discussing the evolution of the EU-ACP relations. The EU’s 
relationship with the former colonies of its member states in Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific regions is the reason why trade and development has become one of 
most important intersections of the EU’s external policies. Through several agree-
ments, the EU has for decades granted unilateral market access to the ACP coun-
tries. However, after these regimes were diagnosed as a failure in promoting devel-
opment, they were judged as incompatible with the EU’s WTO obligations, and 
because developing countries in the rest of the world were gaining in importance 
for the EU, the Union drastically changed its trade-and-development policies in the 
early 2000s. Within its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), it provides tariff-
free market access to all least-developed countries (‘Everything but Arms’), and it 
pursues bilateral trade negotiations with many other developing countries. It also 
increasingly tries to promote non-trade objectives like environmental and social pro-
tection through bilateral (Sustainable Development Chapters in FTAs) and unilateral 
trade policies (‘GSP+’). The chapter also includes a brief discussion of the EU’s 
development and humanitarian policies strictu sensu. As the authors show, ‘a major 
challenge […] consists in striving for policy coherence between trade and develop-
ment policy’ (p. 174). For example, the EU’s pursuit of reciprocal liberalisation with 
developed economies erodes the trade preferences granted to developing countries.
The chapter on challenges for EU trade policy mainly focuses on the EU’s 
increasing network of bilateral trade agreements. These have gained in importance 
after the failure of the Doha Round. But besides a higher quantity of FTAs, also 
their quality has changed. Taking its own integration history as an example, the EU 
has gained an interest in tackling ‘regulatory barriers to trade’, and by exerting its 
‘market power’ aims to externalise its own internal market rules through deep and 
comprehensive trade agreements. Stimulated by its self-conception as a ‘community 
of values’ or a ‘normative power’ and by mobilisation of non-governmental organi-
sations, the EU has also increasingly tried to use trade to promote human rights, 
labour and environmental standards. This poses additional challenges to guarantee 
policy coherence. In addition, because this expansion increases the chance that trade 
agreements include competences held by the Member States, and have to be ratified 
by them as ‘mixed agreements’, this can also lead to ‘institutional challenges’, as 
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epitomised by the ‘CETA saga’. Finally, Gstöhl and De Bièvre mention the rise of 
global value chains as bringing additional challenges to EU trade policy. They criti-
cise FTAs as insufficiently responding to the challenge to exert public authority over 
multinational firms organising these value chains: ‘benefits of economies of scale 
are likely to remain acceptable to the general public as long as public authority over 
multinational companies keeps pace with such development [… inter alia] in the 
field of taxation and international tax cooperation’ (p. 202).
In the final chapter, the authors summarise their main conclusions and specu-
late about ‘Future Prospects of EU Trade Policy’. While not the central aim of their 
descriptive textbook, they explain politicisation of EU trade policy, in line with the 
dominant rational choice institutionalist framework, as the consequence of changes 
to the scope of the trade agenda, the interest groups that are triggered by this, and the 
institutional architecture of EU trade policy. They describe how this led to ‘populist’ 
responses in some member states, how this was partly responsible for Brexit, and 
together with the shifting global power balances may complicate EU trade policy in 
the future. While not making clear predictions (as they promised not to do) of how 
this will change EU trade politics, they end with a positive note for EU trade policy 
scholars: ‘[t]he years to come are therefore bound to be very interesting times’ (p. 
211).
Lessons from TTIP
In his short book, The New Politics of Trade: Lessons from TTIP, Alasdair Young 
discusses one of the political shocks to the trade community discussed at the start 
of this essay, the failure of the TTIP negotiations, while linking this to the other 
surprises Trump and Brexit, which are also ‘manifestations of the broader anti-glo-
balization sentiments’ (p. 2). The author thereby builds on his previous work on EU 
trade politics and transatlantic trade relations. The title of the book echoes a spe-
cial issue that he edited together with John Peterson in (2006). In their introduction 
to this issue, Young and Peterson had already identified how a more ‘deep trade 
agenda’ results in a ‘new politics of trade’.
The book starts by explaining why the initiators of the TTIP negotiations held 
‘misplaced optimism’ about its prospects and their ability to conclude the talks 
on ‘one tank of gas’. The context seemed ideal for a deal. The failure of the Doha 
Development Round gave the EU and the USA an excuse for pursuing a bilateral 
agreement instead of a multilateral deal. The Great Recession and the rise of China 
gave them two compelling reasons to pursue a treaty. And the fact that business 
interests declared their unanimous support for the negotiations seemed to guarantee 
domestic backing. Nonetheless, this confidence turned out to be erroneous. The first 
chapter explains how TTIP was different from other EU trade agreements, because 
it involved engaging with an equal partner and focusing on regulatory barriers to 
trade. This lays the groundwork for explaining its eventual demise in the following 
chapters. It also introduces how trade agreements are negotiated and ratified on both 
sides of the Atlantic. These procedures, Young argues, are ‘suited to simpler times’: 
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‘the US faced particular challenges in coordinating its position, and the EU was con-
strained by a plethora of veto players’ (p. 9).
The next chapter characterises the transatlantic economy as ‘interpenetrated not 
integrated’. While the EU and the USA are each other’s most important trading part-
ner, especially the depth of their investment relationship stands out. Although their 
economic bonds are very strong, both economies should not be considered as ‘inte-
grated’ as they are governed by different regulations. This increases the costs for 
many multinationals that do business on both sides of the Atlantic. These different 
regulations are the result of different political systems and regulatory cultures. In 
turn, the combination of transatlantic economic interpenetration but remaining regu-
latory divergence is crucial to understand the dynamics of the TTIP negotiations dis-
cussed in later chapters. ‘TTIP’s ambition in context’ compares the substance of the 
negotiations with other EU trade agreements. While TTIP also contained traditional 
‘market access’ elements, it stood out for the breadth of its agenda and the potential 
depth of its disciplines. Particularly, the attempt to eliminate regulatory differences 
and to establish institutions and mechanisms to avoid new divergence in the future 
was innovative.
Young discusses in great detail the position of business interests across the 
Atlantic. In contrast with traditional political economy accounts that predict con-
flict between import-competing and exporting firms on trade agreements, business 
politics looked nothing like this. Business interests were in alignment rather than 
in conflict on all issues on the agenda. This can be explained through three factors: 
because tariffs were already low before TTIP, there was little protection to lose; 
because two-way investment between the EU and the USA is so extensive, business 
associations at both sides are dominated by the same firms, who logically advocate 
similar positions; and the importance of global value chains means that protection-
ism hurts many firms involved in them. Business associations hence looked at TTIP 
as pursuing efficiency gains rather than exchanging market access. This unique con-
stellation on the side of business led to the overoptimistic prediction by policy-mak-
ers that the TTIP negotiations could be concluded easily and rapidly.
However, this failed to take into account civil society organisations (CSOs), 
which are indeed often considered to be unimportant in trade politics. Their role 
is discussed in the contestation and politicisation of trade policy. Young explains 
CSOs’ unprecedented mobilisation and its impact in three steps. The focus on ‘non-
tariff barriers’ in TTIP, which seems to result ‘naturally’ from the state of the trans-
atlantic economic relationship and was supported by business, led to concerns at 
the side of CSOs. What business and trade officials consider a ‘non-tariff barrier’ 
is often a cherished regulation in the eyes of CSOs, which they might have fought 
hard for in the past (cfr. De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2017). And because the EU and 
the USA are economic equals, none of the two could expect to impose its rules 
on the other. Second, CSOs were able to frame TTIP as a threat to protection and 
democracy. Third, where this found a receptive ear with society, often for reasons 
that go beyond TTIP itself, opposition to the agreement eventually outweighed sup-
port, such as in Germany and Austria. The main frame used by critical CSOs was 
that TTIP undermines the regulatory autonomy of states, and thereby benefits mul-
tinationals at the detriment of civil society and democracy. This critical framing is 
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different from the discourses of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, which are more 
about the economic loss of certain groups and communities due to globalisation. 
Therefore, Young argues that ‘[p]ublic opposition to TTIP […] was constructed’ 
(p. 91) and that ‘[t]he different depictions of the threat from globalization […] sug-
gest a critical role for policy entrepreneurs in constructing public opposition to trade 
agreements’ (p. 91).
Young then demonstrates how the deep nature of TTIP not only broadened the 
scope of societal actors involved, but also of official actors. At the side of the USA, 
this complicates the negotiating dynamics, while in the EU, it would make the ratifi-
cation of an eventual deal intricate, as the CETA saga amply demonstrated. Besides 
societal contestation, also these institutional challenges impeded the negotiations 
and might have proven sufficient to make a deal impossible.
While TTIP was hence already hanging by a thread because of societal contesta-
tion and institutional complications, Brexit and Trump dealt the final ‘body blows to 
TTIP’. Their consequences for transatlantic trade politics are discussed in the penul-
timate chapter. Brexit not only makes the EU less attractive to the USA, and hence 
leaves the latter less willing to make concessions, by taking out more then one-eight 
of the EU’s market. With the UK, the EU also loses one of the greatest supporters of 
TTIP, making concessions at the side of the EU less likely. Already fraught negotia-
tions only become more difficult. The Trump administration, furthermore, with its 
obsession of reducing trade deficits, its unilateral inclinations, and its unpopularity 
in Europe, makes TTIP even more unthinkable. Young ends, in the final chapter, 
with five ‘lessons from TTIP’ that bear relevance for future trade politics in gen-
eral (p. 123 ff.): (1) the transnationalisation of production through investment and 
global value chains increases the importance of behind-the-border measures; (2) 
this increases support for trade liberalisation among firms; (3) but it leads to more 
opposition on the side of civil society, making trade policy more controversial and 
administratively complicated; (4) regulatory cooperation can also occur outside of 
trade agreements, and this may be easier; (5) and concluding deep trade agreements 
with multiple players might be difficult.
When read together
Collectively, the three books offer a very comprehensive overview of EU trade 
policy, its current challenges, and controversies. Rodrik explains what is behind 
these challenges and controversies (the too long neglected risk that trade agree-
ments can strengthen multinational companies over governments and civil soci-
ety, and economic over other considerations), why many failed to foresee them 
and what to do about it. Gstöhl and De Bièvre introduce the reader to all the 
dimensions of the policy area in the EU, and to the mainstream thinking on the 
subject. They show how traditional political economy models, combining inter-
ests, institutions, and the international system, help explain many positions the 
EU adopts in trade policy, and why an expanding agenda challenges its legiti-
macy, effectiveness, and coherence. Young applies these insights to the fail-
ure of the TTIP negotiations. He shows how, in the context of changes to the 
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international economy, negotiations between two equals that focus on eliminating 
regulatory differences result in a different conflict constellation than was previ-
ously the case. Instead of a struggle between import-competing and exporting 
firms, business interests tend to align and civil society organisations, which fear 
that protection will be sacrificed at the altar of economic integration, appear in 
the arena as their opponents. They bring normative arguments to the battlefield, 
stimulating more constructivist analyses of trade politics. While Rodrik norma-
tively argues that politicisation may change trade politics for the better through a 
more balanced representation of actors and considerations, Gstöhl and De Bièvre 
and Young note in a more detached way that this complicates trade politics.
Young argued that decision-making procedures in trade in the EU and the USA 
were ‘suited for simpler times’ (p. 7). I believe these books, and Rodrik’s in par-
ticular, show that the same can be said for the old rational-choice explanations of 
trade policy. The policy domain can no longer be satisfactorily modelled as sim-
ply a function of conflict between two economic interest groups, exporting and 
import-competing firms, where trade agreements provide office-seeking politi-
cians with the instruments to overcome protectionist opposition to the supposedly 
optimal outcome of free trade. As the books by Gstöhl and De Bièvre and Young 
show, political scientists have already began to adapt their models, by bringing 
in new economic interest groups (such as importers and retailers) as well as civil 
society organisations and giving somewhat greater weight to the role of ideas 
besides interests and institutions. They thereby answer to Rodrik’s plea for social 
scientists to be academic foxes.
However, in line with Rodrik’s additional criticism on trade policy and how it 
is studied, we could argue that political scientists could do more. Rodrik argues 
that current trade agreements, rather than generating welfare improvements, result 
primarily in income and power redistribution and may as a consequence under-
mine domestic social bargains. Political science analyses of trade policy could 
help study if and how multinational companies actively capture trade agreements 
to promote their interests or how trade liberalisation structurally increases their 
market power, and how this affects domestic political outcomes. This includes 
constructivist analyses of how the rhetoric about regulations as ‘non-tariff barri-
ers’ affects domestic regulatory politics (cfr. De Ville 2011). This might sound as 
unattractively normative scholarship to some. But as Robert Cox stated, research 
‘is always for someone and for some purpose’ (1981: 129). Rodrik has convinc-
ingly shown that traditional political economy accounts of trade policy implic-
itly support economic integration and those who benefit from it. Scholars using 
them are also normative often without realising it. While this stance might have 
been laudable in the period after the Second World War with 1930s beggar-thy-
neighbour policies fresh in mind, today, as Gstöhl and De Bièvre recognise, the 
challenge to which we may wish to contribute is to restore public authority over 
multinational companies. If we as analysts don’t bring in real politics in trade 
policy, we again leave the field to the likes of Trump to do that for us.
Understanding EU trade politics after TTIP, Trump and Brexit 
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